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Are Belgian hospitals prepared for an H5N1-pandemic?
Harald G. De Cauwera, Luc J.M. Mortelmansb and Vincent d’Orioc
Objective Virulent airborne diseases can be a real burden
to a nation’s health system. The most recent threat is the
fear of a mutation-induced H5N1-influenza pandemic.
We studied whether Belgian hospitals are able to deal
with H5N1-influenza infected patients in the case of a
pandemic. Many patients, including children, may require
artificial ventilation within 48h after admission.
Methods A survey aimed at determining ‘availability and
preparedness’ was sent by e-mail to the different Belgian
Emergency Departments.
Results and discussion Sixty-five hospitals were finally
included. The amount of patients being potentially admitted
is limited, owing to the reduced number of intensive care
beds equipped with automatic ventilators. Furthermore, the
number of available intensive care beds for children is still
lower than for adult patients. The number of mortuary
places, in the case of a catastrophe, is also insufficient.
Although most hospitals set up a disaster plan on H5N1,
there are only limited stocks of antiviral medication to
protect the hospital staff in the acute phase. A separate
triage area is only available in a limited number of
hospitals. We conclude that Belgian hospitals and
emergency departments are not equipped to deal with
potential pandemic situations. European Journal of
Emergency Medicine 14:204–206 c 2007 Lippincott
Williams & Wilkins.
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Introduction
In recent years, several viral infections caused endemics,
for example, Ebola in Africa, SARS in the Far East and
Canada [1,2].
H5N1-influenza is also considered to be a possible threat
for public health: a pandemic of a mutated H5N1-
influenza-strain could theoretically cause millions of
deaths [3,4].
SARS displayed that our health systems/hospitals are not
able to deal with a pandemic of highly virulent airborne
diseases [2].
A shortage of well-equipped emergency department
(ED) and intensive care facilities is found, to treat highly
contagious people.
In Toronto during the first SARS episode, negative
pressure/laminar flow rooms and sanitary ante-rooms
had to be constructed on the spot.
A whole range of measures to reduce the spreading of
SARS was successfully deployed.
Both SARS and H5N1-influenza may cause acute
respiratory insufficiency and possible multiorgan failure.
Children seem to be more vulnerable to H5N1.
As a result, a large number of infected patients may be
expected to require intensive care and mechanical
ventilation. Finally, mortality may be as high as 80% in
children.
Recently, not only viral infections showed health systems
to be ineffective, but also the 2003 heat wave in Europe
(especially in France) raised concerns about hospital
ability and the efficiency of the health system to care for
an overwhelming amount of patients. Hospital staff
rushed back from holidays to the emergency/intensive
care departments. The large numbers of deaths (more
than 19 times the death toll of the SARS epidemic
worldwide), and shortage of available mortuary places,
urged the government and undertakers to take over
refrigerated warehouses, to call back vacationing workers
and even the retired, and to extend the hours of
crematoriums. The catastrophe had been particularly
difficult for families because they were forced to bury
their loved ones without the usual arrangements provided
by undertakers [5–7].
We wanted to know to which extent our Belgian hospitals
are prepared for a possible human H5N1 pandemic.
Methods
A written survey was sent by e-mail to all Belgian EDs
during the period of April–May 2006. Both regional and
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university hospitals were asked to participate. The main
question was to know if hospitals already had a disaster
plan for H5N1-influenza, as well as if a sufficient number
of protective clothing and N95-masks were available.
Finally, we asked for antiviral medication availability for
the hospital staff. Specific items were requested to
evaluate the number of adult and paediatric beds in
intensive care units (ICU), the number of intensive care
beds equipped with isolation ante-rooms, including
laminar flow or negative pressure systems, and the
number of mechanical ventilators available in ICU.
Finally, we checked for the number of available mortuary
places in hospitals.
Statistical analysis was performed using Statview 4.0
(Abacus concepts, Inc., Berkeley, California, USA) for the
Macintosh computer.
Results
A total of 65 hospitals completed the survey, 10 university
and 55 regional hospitals. Table 1 depicts hospital size
and admissions to the ED as well as ICU facilities.
A disaster plan for H5N1 is available in nine out of 10
university and in 34 out of 55 regional hospitals [w2,
P=0.08 (not significant)].
Despite the existence of a disaster plan, only a minority
of institutions hold a stock of antiviral medication to
supply both patients and hospital staff (8/10 university
and 14/55 regional hospitals – w2, P=0.001). This figure
is probably overstated. It was noted that some hospitals
replied that they have as little as three boxes of 10 pills of
neuraminidase inhibitors. Most hospitals, however, did
not mention the exact amount of antiviral medication.
Most EDs have protective clothing and masks, the
proportion being 9/10 for university and 34/55 for regional
hospitals (w2, P=0.08).
Only seven out of 10 university and 17 out of 55 regional
hospitals have EDs with a separate triage area (w2,
P=0.02).
A total of 758 (range 0–64, mean 11.8, median 9) in-
hospital mortuary places in the n=65 hospitals were
reported. It should be noted that some hospitals are
lacking mortuary facilities.
Table 2 displays the data related to ICU and paediatric
ward capacity.
Discussion
One of the concerns in dealing with a pandemic, is the
overload of the public health system. Scenario analysis by
a Dutch group revealed that (with a supposed attack rate
of 30%) at least 10 000 hospital admissions would be
influenza related. They also estimated that they would be
confronted with more than 4000 influenza-related deaths
(for a population of 15 million people) [8]. The Belgian
Government estimated a pandemic would cause up to
22 000 deaths (population of 10 million inhabitants).
It is clear that the 758 mortuary places in hospitals are
largely insufficient. Furthermore, the capacity of private
undertakers is too small to deal with the large number of
casualties during a pandemic.
The same Dutch group studied the effect of prophylactic
treatment with neuraminidase inhibitors on hospital
admissions and death toll. About 5000 hospital admissions
would be prevented as well as 2000 deaths when treating
4.7 million people. The efficiency of prophylactic
treatment is unknown, so the need to have a stock of
antiviral medication is still being debated [9,10]. As some
H5N1-strains are reported to be resistant to oseltamivir,
the stocks of oseltamivir could be meaningless.
Most Belgian hospitals are not fully prepared to cope with
a pandemic. University hospitals have made more
preparations than regional hospitals, but even they are
not fully equipped. Many EDs lack an operational
separate triage room. So patients suspected of H5N1-
influenza cause a higher risk of transmission of the virus
to other patients admitted in the ED.






Yearly admissions at ED 0–72000 21684 17000 14 09 458
Number of hospital beds 84–1580 426 336 27697
Number of ICU beds 0–119 17.3 12 1122
Number of ICU beds
with isolation
ante-room
0–31 3.5 1 225






0–30 2.9 0 191
ED, emergency department; ICU, intensive care unit.
Table 2 Availability in paediatric and specific paediatric ICU





Number of beds at paediatric
ward
0–145 25.8 22 1679
Number of beds at paediatric
ward with isolation
ante-room
0–16 2.9 2 183
Number of paediatric ICU beds 0–15 1.1 0 75
ICU, intensive care unit.
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The number of ICU beds (especially paediatric ICU
beds) is far too low to deal with a catastrophe, for
example, an H5N1-influenza-pandemy, with a majority of
patients requiring ventilatory support.
Prophylactic treatment of staff members and patients
with neuraminidase inhibitors cannot be started on time
because hospitals do not have stocks of antiviral
medication (situation May–June 2006). Therefore, doc-
tors and paramedics risk being part of the second wave of
victims of the pandemic. Who will take care for the
overwhelming amount of patients then?
We will be confronted with the mass casualty treatment
priority dilemma. Can we decide which patients will be
admitted to the ICU ward and which will be left
untreated? Do we need to set up criteria to choose who
could benefit most of ventilatory support? Do we need to
consider which patients will be given palliative support
only because of shortage of ICU-capacity? Should
patients be treated on a first come first served basis, or
only young urban professionals and children? But even
then, how many of them can be treated, as hospital
resources are largely insufficient?
The shortage of hospital facilities and protective mea-
sures for the hospital staff raises ethical considerations.
Can we urge hospital employees to work in a highly
contagious site without proper protective clothing and
prophylactic treatment? Should only volunteers be used?
Although we could not obtain a complete set of data from
the 142 EDs, we believe that the hospitals which
collaborated with our study were probably those in the
best position to deal with such a potential public health
catastrophe.
In conclusion, despite the Belgian Government’s opti-
mism, we believe that our hospitals and EDs would not
be able to cope with an H5N1-influenza pandemic.
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